🇱🇧 /🇮🇱 A brief analysis of Israel’s impending ground offensive in Lebanon:
Everything that the Israeli leadership is now saying about dismantling Hezbollah’s capabilities was also said in 2006 (quote above), and they ultimately lost the war.
Although a significant portion of Hezbollah’s leadership has been eliminated, all of the high-ranking commanders have already been replaced. Hezbollah has always known that their commanders are at risk of assassination, and it is extremely naive to assume that they do not have contingency plans for such situations.
Furthermore, Hezbollah is an asymmetric military force, with its units operating mostly autonomously at the initiative of local field commanders. Even without active central leadership (which is currently the case), the resistance continues on the ground.
Regarding Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal, Israel claims to have destroyed more than half of the group’s capabilities in the past week. However, this is likely exaggerated as most of the targets of the airstrikes were part of a pre-planned database based on old or outdated intelligence. Hezbollah is dynamic and can quickly move their launchers.
It is likely that the recent strikes have to some extent affected Hezbollah’s long-range and medium-range rocket capabilities, but not enough to completely neutralize the rocket threat. It should be noted that Hezbollah’s strategic assets, such as ballistic missiles, are stored in fortified bases underground. Many of them are located in Syria and the Beqaa Valley. When it comes to short-range rockets, that’s a different story; Hezbollah simply will never run out, they have too much stuff.
Hezbollah’s main disadvantage at the moment is Israel’s superior air force and surveillance. They probably still have the weaponry to carry out larger rocket attacks against Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv, but such large-scale attacks would require thorough planning and execution, and during the staging phase, Israel would likely detect the buildup of rockets and strike the launcher formations preemptively. This means that Hezbollah currently has to resort to a “hit and run” tactic, launching rockets sporadically from blind spots and immediately relocating to another place.
Hezbollah’s real strength lies in ground combat in the south. Hezbollah is intertwined with the local population, with a few hundred to a few thousand Hezbollah barracks in almost every southern Lebanese village, which are independently commanded and well armed. Most importantly, they have an advantage that Hamas does not; modern Iranian-made ATGMs, in extremely large quantities.
In 2006, we saw villages like Bint Jbeil and Ayta al-Sha’ab resist the IDF for weeks, only with their local Hezbollah garrisons, sometimes just dozens of fighters against thousands of Israeli forces. The IDF was forced to leave both cities, suffering heavy losses. Hezbollah is now much stronger than in 2006, better organized and better equipped. Israel is facing a tough battle.
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